Cvria Cardani

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the governance action to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5 constitutional. The action strengthens governance continuity by creating an operational buffer for the Constitutional Committee while preserving the existing committee structure and remaining within the applicable guardrails.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed

This governance action is a Parameter Change proposing to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5.

The expected effect is to reduce the risk that the Constitutional Committee becomes unable to operate if the number of registered committee members temporarily falls below 7. The action does not remove any Constitutional Committee member, does not reduce the current number of committee seats, and does not alter the role of the Constitutional Committee. It only adjusts the minimum registered committee size required for the committee to remain operational on-chain.

Constitutional and guardrails assessment

The action is constitutionally aligned because it supports continuity of Cardano governance while preserving the Constitutional Committee's function as a constitutional safeguard. The proposal addresses a governance-system parameter and provides a clear reason for the change: avoiding unnecessary governance fragility if a vacancy, resignation, term issue, or other operational event causes the number of registered committee members to fall below the current minimum.

The proposed value of 5 remains within the relevant guardrail range for committeeMinSize. It is not negative, it is not below the minimum permitted value of 3, and it does not exceed the maximum permitted value of 10. Therefore, the parameter value itself does not conflict with the applicable guardrails.

The action is also consistent with the constitutional principles of transparent, resilient, and accountable governance. It improves operational resilience without preventing the community from maintaining a 7-seat Constitutional Committee through the normal election and governance processes.

Governance quality assessment

The action is clear in scope: it changes one governance parameter, committeeMinSize, from 7 to 5. The intended outcome is measurable and limited: the Constitutional Committee can continue to satisfy its minimum-size requirement even if temporary membership changes occur.

The action is feasible because it is a direct parameter update rather than a broad process change. It does not require treasury spending, does not introduce new administrative powers, and does not create new obligations for ada holders, DReps, SPOs, or the Constitutional Committee beyond the parameter change itself.

The action is also reversible through a future governance action if the community later determines that a higher committeeMinSize is preferable. This reversibility supports a positive constitutional finding because the change is not an irreversible alteration of Cardano's governance structure.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds this governance action constitutional. The action is narrow, technically bounded, within the applicable guardrails, and directed at maintaining governance continuity rather than weakening constitutional oversight.

Precedent Discussion: A positive vote on this action supports the precedent that governance-system parameter changes can be constitutional when they are narrow in scope, clearly justified, technically bounded, and within the guardrails. This action distinguishes between reducing the minimum operational committee size and reducing the actual number of Constitutional Committee seats. That distinction is important because the action does not remove members, shorten terms, prevent future elections, or eliminate constitutional review. It simply lowers the minimum-size parameter to reduce the risk of governance inoperability.

Counterargument Discussion: A reasonable counterargument is that reducing committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 may make a smaller Constitutional Committee possible in some future circumstance, which could affect perceived representativeness or voting dynamics. Cardano Curia acknowledges that this is a valid governance-design concern for DReps and ada holders to consider.

However, the constitutional question is whether the proposed parameter value violates the Constitution or the applicable guardrails. The proposed value of 5 remains within the permitted range, and the action does not itself reduce the current Constitutional Committee to 5 members. It instead provides an operational safety margin if membership temporarily falls below 7.

Another counterargument is that parameters critical to governance should be changed cautiously. Cardano Curia agrees. In this case, the cautious approach is supported by the narrowness of the change, the existence of a clear operational rationale, and the fact that the change remains reversible by future governance action.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia judges the governance action to reduce committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 to be constitutional. The action is clear, limited, reversible, and within the applicable guardrails. It supports governance continuity while preserving the role and safeguards of the Constitutional Committee. Cardano Curia therefore records 5 constitutional votes, 0 unconstitutional votes, 0 abstentions, 0 did-not-vote, and 0 against votes.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the IO: Hydra Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Rationale: ## Determination
Cardano Curia finds the IO: Hydra Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Purpose and scope

The proposal requests 5,100,781 ada to support continued development and production hardening of Hydra. The funded programme covers performance optimisation, operational excellence, ecosystem support and improvements to developer experience.

The intended effect is to strengthen Hydra as scalable Layer 2 infrastructure for Cardano applications.

Governance action standards

The proposal identifies a legitimate and defined treasury purpose and provides a stated funding amount, bounded workstreams, milestone-based delivery, administration arrangements and independent delivery assurance.

These materials provide sufficient information to understand what is being funded and how delivery will be assessed.

Treasury Withdrawal requirements

The proposal provides defined workstreams, relevant costs, milestone-gated delivery, treasury administration and independent assurance.

Intersect is designated as administrator, providing separation between the delivery team and treasury custody. The Treasury Reserve Smart Contract and project-specific contract framework support controlled disbursement, public traceability and reconciliation.

The proposal includes mechanisms for oversight, delivery verification, refund or reconciliation of unused funds and auditable custody. Funds held by the administrator are not to be delegated to a Stake Pool Operator and are to use the predefined abstain voting option.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia finds that the action adequately addresses the applicable Treasury Withdrawal standards concerning purpose, delivery scope, relevant costs, administration, independent assurance, oversight, refund conditions and auditable custody.

Questions concerning Hydra adoption, the likelihood of achieving every performance target or whether this initiative is the highest-priority use of treasury funds are policy and value-for-money questions for DReps and ada owners. They do not establish a conflict with the Constitution.

Cardano Curia identifies no constitutional violation.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the principle that Treasury funding for core scaling infrastructure may be constitutional where the proposal defines the funded work, provides milestone-based delivery, separates delivery from treasury administration and includes independent assurance and auditable custody controls.

Counterargument Discussion: A reasonable concern is that Hydra adoption and ecosystem impact may be difficult to predict. Another concern is whether the requested amount represents optimal value compared with other scaling initiatives. Cardano Curia considers these to be policy and budget-prioritisation matters rather than constitutional defects. The proposal establishes a defined scope, delivery controls and oversight mechanisms sufficient for constitutional review.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It provides a defined infrastructure purpose, bounded workstreams, milestone-based delivery, independent assurance, treasury administration and auditable custody arrangements.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional. The action has a clear reimbursement purpose, a specified amount, immediate on-chain delivery, and a limited scope that does not create an ongoing program of work or continuing treasury administration.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed

This governance action proposes a Treasury Withdrawal of ₳103,000 from the Cardano Treasury to reimburse the submitter of the earlier “Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -” Info Action.

The requested amount consists of ₳100,000 for the original governance action deposit and ₳3,000 intended to compensate for forgone staking rewards. The expected effect is a one-time direct reimbursement to the specified recipient upon enactment.

Constitutional and guardrails assessment

Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It is properly framed as a Treasury Withdrawal and is therefore assessed under the constitutional requirements for governance action standards and treasury withdrawal standards.

The proposal identifies a specific purpose: reimbursement of a governance action deposit and associated forgone staking rewards. It also identifies the relevant amount, the immediate delivery mechanism, and the limited nature of the withdrawal. This is not a request to fund an ongoing program, service contract, development roadmap, or multi-stage delivery process. The constitutional delivery is the reimbursement itself.

The proposal is limited in scope and does not introduce new protocol behavior, alter monetary policy, change governance rights, or create continuing obligations for the Cardano Blockchain. The withdrawal is a single, direct transfer whose execution can be verified on-chain by any ada holder.

The action also appears consistent with treasury stewardship principles because the requested amount is specific, bounded, and tied to a concrete prior governance action. It does not request open-ended funding, discretionary spending authority, or administrator-held custody for later disbursement.

Treasury-specific assessment

For ordinary treasury withdrawals that fund work over time, strong requirements for milestones, reporting, audits, administration, and custody controls are essential. This action is materially different because the proposed use of funds is completed by a single direct reimbursement.

The withdrawal does not create a period during which funds are held by an administrator before further disbursement. It does not require a future delivery schedule, milestone approval process, vendor management structure, or ongoing expenditure monitoring. The relevant use of the funds is the direct reimbursement transaction itself.

For that reason, Cardano Curia finds that the auditability, oversight, administrator, and custody requirements are satisfied in substance on these specific facts. The transfer either occurs as authorized or it does not, and the result is publicly verifiable on-chain.

Determination

Cardano Curia determines that this Treasury Withdrawal is constitutionally aligned. It has a clear purpose, a specified amount, immediate delivery, limited scope, and no continuing discretionary treasury administration. The action is therefore suitable for a positive constitutional finding.

Precedent Discussion: This vote supports the precedent that Treasury Withdrawal actions should be assessed according to their factual structure. In most treasury proposals, funds are requested for work to be performed over time, and therefore milestones, reporting, audits, custody controls, and administrator responsibilities must be robustly specified.

This action is different. It is a direct reimbursement action where the payment itself is the deliverable. The community can verify the amount, destination, and completion of the transfer on-chain. Treating this structure as constitutionally valid does not weaken treasury oversight; instead, it applies the same constitutional principles proportionally to a narrow one-time reimbursement.

This precedent should not be read as allowing ordinary project-funding withdrawals to avoid audit, oversight, milestone, or reporting requirements. It applies only where the entire purpose and delivery of the withdrawal are completed through a single transparent on-chain transfer.

Counterargument Discussion: One possible counterargument is that every Treasury Withdrawal should include a separate allocation for independent audits and oversight metrics, regardless of the nature of the withdrawal. Cardano Curia does not find that necessary in this specific case because there is no continuing fund use to audit periodically. The relevant financial event is the one-time reimbursement, which is publicly verifiable on-chain.

A second counterargument is that a named human or organizational administrator should always be required. Cardano Curia recognizes the importance of administration in ordinary treasury programs. However, in this action, there is no discretionary post-enactment administration. The protocol directly executes the authorized transfer, and the community can verify whether the transfer occurred.

A third counterargument is that the fairness of reimbursing a lost governance action deposit is a policy question. Cardano Curia agrees. The Constitutional Committee’s role is not to decide whether reimbursement is the best policy choice for ada holders, but to decide whether the action conflicts with the Constitution. On that question, Cardano Curia finds no constitutional conflict.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the “Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit” Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

The action is clear, bounded, directly executable, and publicly verifiable. It requests a specified amount for a specific reimbursement purpose and does not create an ongoing spending program or administrator-held custody arrangement.

Cardano Curia therefore records 5 constitutional votes, 0 unconstitutional votes, 0 abstentions, 0 did-not-vote, and 0 against votes.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the “Hard Fork to Protocol Version 11 (‘van Rossem’ Hard Fork)” governance action constitutional. The action is a focused intra-era hard fork that upgrades Cardano mainnet to protocol version 11.0 while remaining in the Conway era, improving Plutus capability, ledger consistency, and node-level security. Cardano Curia also recognizes the naming of this hard fork in remembrance of Max van Rossem and his contributions to Cardano governance and the wider community.

Rationale: ## What is being proposed

This governance action proposes a Hard Fork Initiation to upgrade Cardano mainnet to Protocol Version 11.0, known as the “van Rossem” hard fork.

The expected effect is an intra-era protocol upgrade: Cardano remains in the Conway era, while Protocol Version 11 introduces focused improvements to Plutus capabilities, ledger consistency, and node-level security. The proposal includes new Plutus primitives and improved consistency of built-in functions across Plutus versions, supporting better developer experience and more capable smart-contract execution.

Constitutional and guardrails assessment

Cardano Curia classifies this governance action as a Hard Fork Initiation. It is therefore assessed under the Constitution’s general governance action standards and the hard-fork-related guardrails requiring sufficient technical review, scrutiny, ecosystem readiness, and protection of Cardano’s security, functionality, performance, and long-term sustainability.

The action is constitutionally aligned. It does not alter ada ownership rights, censor transactions, restrict access to the Cardano Blockchain, or interfere with governance participation. Instead, it proposes a technical protocol upgrade intended to improve the functionality, security, and developer capability of the network.

The proposal is narrow and technically bounded. It is an intra-era hard fork rather than a new ledger-era transition. This reduces ecosystem disruption because transaction shape and the broader era structure remain stable while the protocol gains targeted improvements.

The proposal also recognizes the relevant readiness condition that at least 85% of stake pools by active stake should have upgraded to a node version capable of supporting Protocol Version 11 before ratification. This condition is important because hard fork initiation requires broad infrastructure readiness and coordinated adoption across the network.

Governance quality assessment

The action has a clear scope: upgrade Cardano mainnet to protocol version 11.0. The intended outcome is measurable: the network either enacts the hard fork and reaches the new protocol version, or it does not.

The action is also supported by a coherent technical rationale. The proposed upgrade bundles focused improvements to Plutus performance and capability, ledger consistency, and node-level security. These are appropriate subjects for a hard fork where changes require protocol-level coordination.

The risk profile is acceptable because the action is not a broad redesign of Cardano’s governance or economics. It does not request treasury funds, change monetary policy, or alter voting rights. The main risks are ordinary hard-fork risks: insufficient node readiness, ecosystem coordination issues, or technical regressions. These risks are mitigated by readiness reporting, SPO participation, technical review, and the explicit upgrade-readiness condition.

Remembrance of Max van Rossem

Cardano Curia also acknowledges the significance of naming this hard fork in remembrance of Max van Rossem. Max contributed to Cardano as a community member, DRep, governance participant, and contributor to the constitutional governance process. Naming Protocol Version 11 the “van Rossem” hard fork appropriately records his contribution in Cardano’s public governance history.

This remembrance is not the constitutional basis for the vote; the constitutional basis is the technical validity, bounded scope, readiness expectations, and absence of conflict with the Constitution. However, the naming is consistent with Cardano’s practice of remembering contributors who helped shape the ecosystem.

Determination

Cardano Curia finds this Hard Fork Initiation constitutional. The action is clear, technically bounded, governance-legible, and aligned with the long-term functionality and sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain. It improves protocol capability while preserving continuity in the Conway era and respecting the constitutional role of SPOs, DReps, and the Constitutional Committee in hard fork governance.

Precedent Discussion: This vote supports the precedent that Cardano hard fork actions can be constitutional when they are technically scoped, supported by readiness expectations, and designed to improve the network without undermining user rights, governance rights, or monetary stability.

It also supports the precedent that protocol upgrades may carry community memory when the naming is transparent and does not obscure the technical substance of the action. The remembrance of Max van Rossem is appropriate because the proposal remains grounded in a clear technical upgrade and does not rely on commemoration as a substitute for constitutional analysis.

For future hard forks, Cardano Curia expects similarly clear metadata, technical rationale, readiness reporting, ecosystem communication, and explicit attention to stake pool upgrade thresholds before ratification.

Counterargument Discussion: One possible counterargument is that any hard fork carries technical and coordination risk. Cardano Curia agrees. Hard forks should be treated with care because they can affect node operators, wallets, exchanges, dApps, and users. In this case, the proposal is limited to an intra-era upgrade, avoids a ledger-era transition, and includes a readiness expectation for stake pools, which reduces the constitutional concern.

Another counterargument is that the naming and remembrance element could distract from the technical review. Cardano Curia does not find that concern decisive here. The proposal’s constitutional validity rests on the protocol upgrade itself, not on the memorial naming. The remembrance of Max van Rossem is respectful and historically meaningful, but the action remains reviewable as a technical Hard Fork Initiation.

A further concern is whether sufficient ecosystem readiness has been achieved before ratification. Cardano Curia treats readiness as a necessary operational condition. The action remains constitutionally supportable where readiness is verified through stake pool upgrade data, Intersect Hard Fork Working Group reporting, and the normal hard fork governance process.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the “Hard Fork to Protocol Version 11 (‘van Rossem’ Hard Fork)” governance action constitutional.

The action is a focused intra-era protocol upgrade that supports Cardano’s functionality, security, developer capability, and long-term sustainability. It remains within the Conway era, minimizes ecosystem disruption, and includes an appropriate readiness expectation for stake pool adoption.

Cardano Curia also records its respect and remembrance for Max van Rossem, whose contributions to Cardano governance and community life are appropriately honored by the naming of this hard fork.

Cardano Curia therefore records 5 constitutional votes, 0 unconstitutional votes, 0 abstentions, 0 did-not-vote, and 0 against votes.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Cardano Critical Integrations V2 Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Rationale: ## Determination
Cardano Curia finds the Cardano Critical Integrations V2 Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Purpose and scope

The proposal requests 23,000,000 ada to fund twelve months of maintenance and enhancement for existing critical-integration infrastructure, including Circle, LayerZero, Pyth and Dune, together with the development and operation of a native Fireblocks integration. The proposal defines a bounded continuation scope and excludes unrelated new integrations, application-layer initiatives, liquidity programmes, marketing, events and other future strategic activities.

Governance action standards

The proposal satisfies Article II, Section 6 by providing a title, abstract, rationale, defined scope, exclusions, budget explanation, administration model, reporting commitments, refund circumstances and supporting information. These materials provide sufficient context to understand the intended withdrawal and expected effect.

Treasury Withdrawal requirements

The proposal specifies a twelve-month delivery period and provides relevant cost categories covering integration and maintenance costs, an enhancement and tooling reserve, and legal, audit and contract administration.

It states that unused funds will be returned to the Cardano Treasury at the end of the delivery period, upon termination of a relevant contract, where a budget category is fully satisfied with funds remaining, or where a material change makes continued disbursement inappropriate.

The proposal discloses that the recipient structure previously received 70,000,000 ada from the Cardano Treasury under the Cardano Critical Integrations Budget during the preceding 24 months. It also states that the present withdrawal is structured to remain within the applicable Net Change Limit and is denominated in ada.

Funds are allocated for independent audits and oversight reporting. The proposal commits to biannual reports covering financial summaries, treasury reconciliation, integration-maintenance status, Fireblocks delivery status, enhancement-reserve activity, audit and compliance statements and a future governance outlook.

Intersect is designated as administrator. Maintenance renewals and enhancement-reserve drawdowns are subject to Steering Committee approval, with Intersect executing approved disbursements through the Treasury Reserve Smart Contract Framework.

The withdrawn funds will be held in separate, publicly observable accounts, will not be delegated to a Stake Pool Operator and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia finds that the proposal adequately addresses the mandatory Treasury Withdrawal requirements concerning purpose, delivery period, relevant costs, refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, audits and oversight, administrator designation and auditable custody.

Questions about whether the requested amount represents optimal value, whether Fireblocks should be prioritised or whether the integrations merit continued funding are policy matters for DReps and ada owners. The Constitutional Committee's review is limited to whether the action conflicts with the Constitution, and Cardano Curia identifies no such conflict.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the principle that a continuation Treasury Withdrawal may be constitutional where the funded services are clearly identified, the delivery period is bounded, relevant cost categories are disclosed, operational discretion is subject to identified controls, reporting and independent audit obligations are established, and unused funds must be returned. The Constitution does not require every vendor contract or commercially sensitive price to be published where the proposal otherwise provides sufficient cost categories, administration controls and public reconciliation.

Counterargument Discussion: A potential concern is that vendor-level costs are not publicly disclosed because of confidentiality obligations and that a substantial portion of the requested funds is grouped under integration and maintenance costs. This limits public cost granularity. However, the proposal identifies the funded integrations, describes the expenses covered by that category, establishes Steering Committee approval and administrator controls, and commits to audit, reporting and reconciliation. Cardano Curia therefore regards this as a policy and value-for-money consideration rather than a constitutional defect.

A further concern is that the enhancement reserve allows a degree of operational discretion. Cardano Curia does not find this unconstitutional because the reserve is ring-fenced, limited to the twelve-month scope, subject to Steering Committee approval, covered by reporting obligations and subject to the return of unused funds.

The possible conversion of approved disbursements into stablecoins or use of institutional custody does not alter the fact that the Treasury Withdrawal itself is denominated in ada and remains subject to the stated administration and audit controls.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It provides a defined twelve-month purpose and scope, relevant cost categories, prior-funding disclosure, refund conditions, independent audit and oversight commitments, a named administrator, controlled disbursement arrangements and auditable treasury custody.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the 5am.earth Trust Layer Targeting Vision 2030 KPIs Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Rationale: ## Determination
Cardano Curia finds the 5am.earth Trust Layer Targeting Vision 2030 KPIs Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Purpose and terms

The action requests a hard cap of 10,000,000 ada to fund an 18-month programme developing and scaling an open, Cardano-anchored agricultural trust layer. The programme combines digital identity, verified farm and crop records, satellite-oracle data, credentialing, traceability and compliance workflows, and finance-related application paths.

Delivery is structured around milestones at months 6, 12 and 18. Disbursements are milestone-gated at 5,000,000 ada on approval, 2,000,000 ada following M1 acceptance, and 3,000,000 ada following M2 acceptance.

The proposal identifies the relevant programme activities, budget categories, measurable milestones, acceptance evidence and refund conditions. Refund circumstances include unspent funds at programme completion, material milestone failure, fraud, scope abandonment and surplus arising where ada appreciation takes the available value above the defined programme threshold. The 10,000,000 ada amount is a hard cap, with no top-up request if ada depreciates.

Governance action standards

The proposal is anchored to immutable IPFS content with a blake2b-256 hash and contains a title, abstract, motivation, rationale, delivery strategy, milestones, budget justification, governance structure, risk management, refund provisions, audit arrangements and supporting references. Cardano Curia therefore finds the requirements of Article II, Section 6 satisfied.

Prior funding and Net Change Limit

The proposal discloses that neither the 5am.earth Foundation nor the named consortium entities received ada through a Treasury Withdrawal governance action during the preceding 24 months. It separately discloses relevant Project Catalyst support.

The 10,000,000 ada request is stated to fall within the applicable 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit and is denominated in ada.

Audit, oversight and administration

The budget includes administration, independent assurance and audit. An independent third-party assurer will be competitively procured, with formal audit reviews at M2 and M3. Oversight measures include public milestone reports, an on-chain KPI dashboard, monthly community updates and quarterly narrative and DRep-facing reports.

Intersect is designated as administrator through the Treasury Reserve Smart Contract and Project-Specific Smart Contract framework. The proposal separates programme delivery from treasury administration and provides for an external Oversight Committee, milestone verification, contract administration and controlled disbursement.

Funds will be held in publicly auditable smart-contract accounts, will not be delegated to a Stake Pool Operator and will be delegated to the predefined abstain voting option.

Constitutional assessment

Cardano Curia finds that the proposal adequately addresses the mandatory Treasury Withdrawal requirements concerning purpose, delivery period, relevant costs, refund circumstances, prior-funding disclosure, Net Change Limit compliance, independent audits, oversight metrics, administrator designation and auditable custody.

The proposal's ambitious adoption and impact projections concern programme feasibility and value rather than constitutionality. Similarly, the initial 5,000,000 ada payment is not unconstitutional because it is tied to programme establishment, procurement, architecture and early execution, while later disbursements remain milestone-gated.

The 5am.earth Foundation is not yet formally registered, but Intersect is the designated treasury administrator throughout. Foundation registration and transfer of the relevant contractual arrangements are tracked programme deliverables. The independent assurer is also not named at submission, but the proposal allocates funding, specifies the assurer's role and procurement method, and defines the audit points. Cardano Curia therefore identifies no constitutional conflict.

Precedent Discussion: This decision supports the principle that a real-world deployment programme may receive a constitutional Treasury Withdrawal where the proposal clearly defines its purpose, period, budget, milestones, payment controls, refund conditions, audits, oversight arrangements and custody protections. Treasury funding is not constitutionally limited to protocol engineering or software infrastructure. Questions concerning strategic priority, adoption forecasts and value for money remain matters for DReps and ada owners.

Counterargument Discussion: A reasonable concern is that the programme relies on ambitious targets, including large-scale farmer registration and long-term projections for transactions, value locked and protocol revenue. Cardano Curia does not treat these projections as constitutional guarantees. They are policy and feasibility claims subject to DRep judgment and later milestone assessment.

A second concern is that 5,000,000 ada is released at the beginning of the programme. The Constitution does not prohibit an initial payment where the funded activities, refund conditions, administration and oversight arrangements are specified. The proposal associates the initial payment with programme establishment, partner procurement, architecture and early implementation, while subsequent payments are milestone-gated.

A third concern is that the proposed Foundation is not formally registered at submission. Cardano Curia finds no constitutional defect because Intersect is the designated treasury administrator and controls disbursement through the smart-contract framework. Foundation registration and contract transfer are explicit milestone requirements.

Finally, the independent assurer is selected after approval rather than named in advance. This is sufficient because the proposal allocates audit funding, specifies an independent procurement process, defines the assurer's role and identifies audit reviews at M2 and M3.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It provides an immutable and sufficiently detailed proposal, a defined 18-month purpose, milestone-gated payments, prior-funding disclosure, refund conditions, independent assurance and oversight arrangements, a named administrator and constitutionally compliant treasury custody.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026: Cardano Title Sponsorship Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Rationale: ## Determination
Cardano Curia finds the Rare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026: Cardano Title Sponsorship Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Purpose and terms

The action requests 2,750,000 ada to fund Cardano title sponsorship of Rare Evo 2026 and Cardano Dev Gov Day 2026. The stated budget covers Dev Gov Day sponsorship, Rare Evo title sponsorship, livestream and media activities, legal and audit costs, taxes and fees, and a venue deposit connected with Dev Gov Day 2027. The budget uses a stated valuation of USD 0.24 per ada.

The proposal divides delivery into two milestones. The first covers execution of Rare Dev Gov Day and Rare Evo 2026 sponsorship activities, including branding, programming, workshops, livestream integration, community access, travel support, booths and media coordination. The second covers post-event reporting and preliminary planning for Dev Gov Day 2027.

Governance action standards

The proposal provides a title, abstract, motivation, rationale, budget breakdown, work packages, milestones, acceptance criteria, administration model, audit and oversight statement, refund conditions and supporting references. Cardano Curia therefore finds that the applicable governance-action standards are satisfied.

Treasury Withdrawal requirements

The proposal identifies the purpose, amount, delivery activities and relevant costs of the withdrawal. Deliverables and acceptance criteria are connected to defined milestones.

Audit and oversight costs are included. Post-event reporting will cover participation data, ecosystem engagement, media reach, livestream analytics and overall ecosystem impact.

Intersect is designated as administrator through the Treasury Reserve Smart Contract and Project-Specific Smart Contract framework. A legal agreement is expected between Rare Network and Cardano Development Holdings, administered by Intersect. Project delivery will be monitored through Intersect's delivery-assurance function, with expected support from a third-party assurer.

The Treasury Reserve Smart Contract framework and external Oversight Committee provide auditable treasury management, controlled disbursement and final reconciliation. The proposal also establishes circumstances for the return of unused or otherwise refundable funds.

The withdrawal is denominated in ada. The proposal states that the requested amount does not, individually or in aggregate at the time of submission, breach the applicable 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit.

Constitutional assessment

The Constitution does not restrict Treasury Withdrawals to protocol engineering, technical infrastructure or open-source software. An ecosystem event and sponsorship proposal may be constitutional where it satisfies the mandatory requirements concerning purpose, terms, costs, administration, audits, oversight, refund conditions and treasury custody.

Questions concerning whether Cardano should purchase title sponsorship, whether Rare Evo provides sufficient ecosystem value, whether travel support and event-access arrangements are appropriate, or whether the 2027 venue deposit is strategically desirable are matters of policy and value for money for DReps and ada owners. They do not establish a constitutional conflict.

The Constitutional Committee's role is limited to determining whether the action conflicts with the Constitution. Cardano Curia identifies no such conflict.

Precedent Discussion: This decision confirms that ecosystem events and sponsorships are not inherently excluded from constitutional treasury funding. A sponsorship Treasury Withdrawal may be constitutional where its purpose, amount, activities, milestones, administration, audit arrangements, reporting obligations, refund conditions and custody controls are sufficiently specified. The determination does not establish that every event sponsorship is desirable or represents good value; those remain policy questions for DReps and ada owners.

Counterargument Discussion: A reasonable concern is that sponsorship, travel support, VIP or community access, media activities and event branding may provide benefits that are difficult to measure or may represent weaker value than direct technical development. Cardano Curia considers these to be policy and prioritisation concerns rather than constitutional defects. The proposal defines the funded activities and requires post-event reporting covering participation, engagement, media reach and livestream analytics.

A further concern is that part of the budget supports a venue deposit for Dev Gov Day 2027, beyond the primary 2026 events. This item is disclosed in the proposal and connected to preliminary planning under the second milestone. Its strategic desirability is for DReps to assess and does not create a constitutional conflict.

The available proposal materials do not indicate a breach of the applicable Net Change Limit or any failure to denominate the withdrawal in ada. Administration, audit, oversight and reconciliation mechanisms are also identified.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It provides a defined withdrawal purpose, stated amount, budget breakdown, milestone structure, acceptance criteria, administrator designation, audit and oversight commitments, refund conditions and Net Change Limit alignment.

Summary: Cardano Curia finds the Peras v1 Mainnet Readiness, History Expiry and Conformance Testing Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional. Four members voted constitutional and one member abstained.

Rationale: ## Determination
Cardano Curia finds this Treasury Withdrawal governance action constitutional.

Purpose and scope

The action requests 18,263,496 ada to fund delivery during 2026–2027 across three related core-infrastructure work packages: Peras v1 mainnet readiness and maintenance, History Expiry, and Conformance Testing for Peras and Leios.

The proposal presents these work packages as connected parts of a delivery pipeline supporting faster finality, node sustainability, protocol resilience and reliable implementation of future scalability features.

Governance action standards

The proposal is presented in a standardized and legible format and includes an abstract, motivation, rationale, work-package structure, budget basis, administration model, refund conditions, audit and oversight arrangements and supporting documentation. Cardano Curia therefore finds that the applicable governance-action standards are satisfied.

Treasury Withdrawal requirements

The proposal identifies the purpose, funded work packages, delivery period, cost basis and delivery model. It specifies that unused or reduced-scope funds will be returned to the Treasury under the stated refund conditions.

The proposal discloses that Tweag has previously been accountable for 11,070,322.68 ada of treasury-funded work allocated within the Treasury Smart Contract.

It states that the present request does not, individually or in aggregate at the time of submission, breach the applicable 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit covering Epoch 613 through Epoch 713. The withdrawal is denominated in ada.

Audit and oversight costs are included within the proposal's overhead and administration model. Intersect's administration fee covers administrative oversight, while independent technical assurance is to be provided through Intersect and a suitably capable third party. The proposal also includes milestone-based disbursement, public demonstrations, status reporting and community-facing project tracking.

Intersect is designated as proposal, contract and audit administrator. A written legal agreement will be established between Tweag and Cardano Development Holdings and administered through Intersect, with project delivery monitored through Intersect's delivery-assurance function and supported by a third-party assurer.

Funds will be administered through the Treasury Reserve Smart Contract and Project-Specific Smart Contract framework. The relevant contracts cannot delegate funds to a Stake Pool Operator and will delegate to the predefined abstain voting option. A public dashboard will support community auditing and tracking of metrics associated with the withdrawn ada.

Dependencies and deliverables

Some programme outcomes depend on broader governance or ecosystem decisions, including CIP progression and possible future hard-fork activation. The proposal appropriately distinguishes those external decisions from deliverables within the funded parties' control. It commits to activation-ready outputs such as merged code, reproducible releases, runbooks, benchmarks, conformance artefacts and governance-action packages.

Combining three related work packages does not create a constitutional defect. The proposal explains their technical relationship and identifies the funded activities, delivery structure, cost basis, administration model and oversight applicable to the combined programme.

The size of the request and the relative priority of Peras, History Expiry and Conformance Testing are policy and technical-prioritisation matters for DReps and ada owners. Cardano Curia identifies no conflict with the Constitution.

Precedent Discussion: This decision is consistent with the principle that a multi-workstream Treasury Withdrawal may be constitutional where the workstreams have a documented relationship and the proposal clearly defines their purpose, delivery period, cost basis, prior-funding disclosure, refund conditions, audit and oversight structure, administrator and treasury custody protections. A proposal may also rely on future governance decisions where it clearly separates activation-ready deliverables from outcomes outside the recipient's control.

Counterargument Discussion: A potential concern is that the proposal combines three complex technical workstreams in a single withdrawal. Cardano Curia does not find this unconstitutional because their relationship is explained and the proposal provides identifiable work packages, deliverables, administration and controls.

Another concern is that some success conditions depend on future CIP progression, ecosystem adoption or hard-fork approval. The recipient cannot guarantee these governance outcomes. However, the proposal defines outputs within the delivery team's control, including merged implementations, releases, benchmarks, runbooks, testing artefacts and governance-action packages.

A further concern is the size of the requested withdrawal. The Constitution does not require the Constitutional Committee to determine whether the amount is economically optimal or whether these technical initiatives should be prioritised over alternatives. Those are matters for DReps and ada owners.

One Cardano Curia member abstained due to the complexity of the combined scope, external dependencies and the fact that some implementation details will be finalized through later contractual and delivery-assurance arrangements. That member did not identify a specific constitutional conflict.

Conclusion: Cardano Curia finds the action constitutional. It provides a clear purpose, defined work packages, delivery structure, relevant cost basis, prior-funding disclosure, refund conditions, audit and oversight commitments, a named administrator, Net Change Limit compliance and constitutionally compliant treasury custody. The internal vote was four constitutional, zero unconstitutional and one abstain.